The Giant Stumbles

Part 2 of my lessons from the Iran War

Last week I wrote about the ending of the Iran war – or at least this phase of it – and what that meant for the protagonists in the region. It was unwise perhaps to do so ahead of the US and Iran agreeing some kind of formal Memorandum of Understanding to bring the whole sorry business to a close, but I think even now we’ve got a good grasp on what has happened, even if it stutters in some more.

So now I wanted to address the broader global dynamics of where this leaves the US. It is clear to me, even if many in political life there don’t see it, that it marks another milestone in the decline of that great power even if the question of whether America can indeed be made great again remains open.

Evidently there are implications for the USA’s Russian and Chinese rivals, as well as some of the emerging lesser powers. There are no prizes for guessing that a war embarked upon over-confidently, without the forces in place at the outset to challenge any Iranian blockade of Hormuz or impose a blockade on the Islamic Republic’s shipping, will have harmed America’s standing as the world’s leading military power.

Donald Trump created so much static with his overconfidence and constantly changing positions about the war and its purpose that it’s hardly surprising that so many opinion formers around the world have reacted with unalloyed schadenfreude. But it’s important to understand that today’s situation has resulted from decades of underinvestment, and decisions taken by other presidents too.

In The Edge, a short book I published eleven years ago, I looked at the falling indices of Western military power and the rising ones of challenger states, examining the effects these combined trends would have. My chapters took in everything from US under-investment in missile stocks, as well as other advanced weaponry needed to fight state adversaries (as opposed to insurgencies in Iraq or Afghanistan) to the embrace of emerging technologies such as drones by countries like Iran.

Pointing out that even at the time The Edge was published (2015), the US military had lost the capability to deploy the kind of forces, including six aircraft carrier groups and several armoured divisions it had at the time of its 1991 campaign against Iraq, we could draw certain conclusions. Such was the reduction in American power, I wrote, that, “even a conventional military campaign against Iran could be a real challenge”.

So here we are, more than a decade on, seeing the outcomes, both in terms of Iran’s ability to strike its neighbours with a family of long range weapons and America’s military limitations. As I’ve noted recently, the US Navy currently struggles to sustain more than two aircraft carriers in the region or to provide a viable system for escorting merchant ships out of the Strait of Hormuz.

It is true, in an all-out war, the US could mobilise hundreds of thousands more troops, dozens of warships and scores more combat aircraft for these tasks. But evidently Trump is not ready politically to commit the country to such a struggle and even if he was there would be many limitations imposed upon such a force by the long under-investment in munitions and support for advanced equipment.

The other point not to lose sight of is that the US military, being highly professional, has demonstrated some advanced capabilities that to some extent mitigate its loss of numbers or mass. Noteworthy for me:

- Use of a large air tanker force to produce strike numbers almost as great as those in 1991 when the US had five times as many combat aircraft in the region;

- The effectiveness of some of those very expensive ‘exquisite’ weapons both in bringing down incoming Iranian missiles as well as suppressing their air defences;

- Relatively low losses in combat aircraft compared to 1991, critically denying the Islamic Republic its chance to parade captured pilots;

- Similarly, US Navy warships have successfully withstood attacks from a variety of Iranian weaponry, protecting their sailors and (so far) preventing the image of a blazing US warship from defining the conflict.

On the other side of the ledger though there are enough negatives to cause many to declare that Trump’s failure to bend Iran to his will, while protecting Arab allies in the Gulf, mark a major defeat for America. Quite a few professional weaknesses have been exposed from the poorly protected nature of US bases in the region to an aircraft loss rate that is unmistakeably higher than that of Israel, that flew almost as many missions.

Perhaps more importantly, in terms of the historical ebb and flow or great powers, the US has been unable to break Iran’s hold over Hormuz, upholding the principle of free navigation that is so important for everything from the global economy to international security.

Furthermore, US military performance even against the more limited yardstick set at the beginning by the Pentagon, of neutralising Iran’s forces has been mediocre. Early claims of having destroyed the great majority of Iran’s missiles or drones have been tempered by more sober analysis over time. Having prepared for this contest for decades, the Islamic Republic have developed whole families of long range weapons, some very cheaply produced, as well as dozens of bunkers, deep underground, in which to store them.

Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee recently, Centcom commander Admiral Bradley Cooper gave an insight into lessons learned by US forces. Asked to list what US forces need to prioritise he replied, “I’d put three things: more electronic warfare, keep counter-UAS [ie anti-drone defences] on the leading edge—tactics change very quickly—and we need to invest more in hard and deeply buried targets”.

On this last question, it has been reported that a couple of years ago the US Air Force had a stock of just 40 of its most powerful bunker-busters the so-called Massive Ordnance Penetrator. Fourteen were used during the June 2025 raids against Iranian nuclear sites.

As for the expenditure of scarce munitions during the latest round of fighting, the Talon interceptor used by the THAAD anti-missile system stands out. The total stock was thought to be about 600 two years ago, 150 were fired in defence of Israel during Iranian attacks of October 2024 and June 2025, now around 200 more have been launched since February this year meaning more than half the national stockpile is gone. Furthermore, Iran has succeeded in damaging some of the radars and launch vehicles used by THAAD batteries sent to the Middle East.

The implications of this for any conflict against China, which, if it goes to war, plans on launching thousands of ballistic missiles against US bases in the Pacific are obvious and grim. There is no rapid fix or easy blame game here: just 73 Talon missiles were manufactured during Joe Biden’s presidency, and although there is now an imperative to boost production by a big margin, the line is not expected to gear up until next year.

Similar stories can be told for the offensive stockpile; more than 1,000 Tomahawk cruise missiles have been fired in this year’s campaign, and almost the full 400 unit inventory of the new PrSM strike missile. In both cases production is being stepped up but it will take years to replace lost stocks, let alone supply the Gulf allies who need replenishment, particularly of items like the Patriot, and, at the back of the queue, the Europeans.

So there is a window of vulnerability here for the next year or two, precisely what General Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned Trump about in February, before the war started. That is particularly relevant to the Chinese, with their timetable of readying the People’s Liberation Army by 2027 for possible operations to take Taiwan.

Longer term, the Trump Administration plans big defence spending increases in order to modernise elements of the US military that fell behind during the long ‘procurement holiday’ of the Clinton, Obama, and Bush years. There are one or two stars here, like the new B-21 bomber prototypes of which are now flying, with reports suggesting development is going very well.

The American military therefore, to use the cliché, stands at a crossroads. It is possible that the recapitalisation planned with Trump’s big increases will turn things around. For both Chinese and Russian leaders this might create a temptation to go sooner rather than later with any military adventures.

But there are other possibilities, not least that a Democratic Party president of a very different hue may replace Trump in 2028, leading to a scaling back or even reversal of Pentagon spending plans. There are also some signs in key areas, that regardless of intent or budget, a future president may be unable to win back US dominance.

That China is building warships at a frantic rate is only too well known in Washington. The Biden Administration began, and Trump has continued, attempts to rectify this.

Despite years of attention to the problem in Washington DC however, little improvement has been achieved, with the construction of nuclear submarines in particular remaining stubbornly slow. Many reasons have been cited, but the loss of critical skills, for example in specialist welding, is key.

Frustration with the lack of progress caused Trump to sack his navy secretary recently. Increasingly, the Pentagon is search for ways to boost its naval strength with construction in Japanese and South Korean yards.

Looking more broadly at the economy, and the struggle for dominance in AI and advanced electronics, attempts that started under first term Trump and Biden to onshore production of the most advanced microchips have so far delivered little despite billions invested. During last year’s tariff war, America received a salutary lesson in its continued dependence on Chinese rare earths and magnets.

Progress by the People’s Republic on everything from shipbuilding to missile stocks, space warfare, to advanced computing may now mean that its rise to dominance is unstoppable. It even outstrips the US in nuclear warhead production, another area where the Americans are struggling with crumbling, long neglected, infrastructure.

So the chances are significant that the late Iran war may be seen not just as an example of presidential hubris or miscalculation, but of underlying realities and the humbling of a great power.