Europe Turns Up the Pressure on Iran

Why Tehran can't keep stalling

Things have reached a fulcrum point on the Iranian nuclear issue – and it’s a good moment to consider which way this might go. The range of options is wide – from resumed war to a nuclear free Iran - and I think even the people who’ve spent 20 years studying this find it impossible to call right now.

So I’m going to tackle this in a different way, looking at what we know about the key players and which way they’re leaning before trying to synthesise things at the end.

The E-3: who, I hear you say? The E-3 is diplo-speak for the European countries closely engaged with the Iranian nuclear question; Germany, France, and the UK. While they were party to the original nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) abandoned by Trump in 2016, they remain true to the spirit of the JCPOA but haven’t been significant players during the recent crisis. But that’s changed today, which is why I decided it was a good time to blog on this. Speaking in Brussels Jean-Noël Barrot the French foreign minister said that since Iran was in violation of that agreement, “France and its partners are justified in reapplying global embargoes on weapons, banks, [and] nuclear equipment”. Unless Iran signals its readiness to re-submit to the terms of that deal, including on-site verification, that this reimposition of controls would take place, “no later than the end of August”.

If the so-called sanctions ‘snap back’ by the big European economies happens it spells big trouble for the Iranian economy. It’s what Israel and America had been hoping for, and with just a month and a half to go to Europe’s deadline, it will concentrate minds in Tehran.

USA: since it bombed Iranian nuclear facilities America has emphasised it is ready for new talks with Iran but with Trumpian suggestions that this is really about the terms of Iran’s capitulation.

Having wobbled earlier this summer on whether or not Iran would be allowed to continue with a civil nuclear programme, allowing low level uranium enrichment, America has now toughened its stance. It wants Iran’s stock of highly enriched uranium (estimated at 408kg by the International Atomic Energy Authority) to be placed under international control, to halt uranium enrichment altogether, and to place controls on Iran’s ballistic missile programmes. These last two measures conflict with the Islamic Republic’s long term red lines, emphasising its right to a nuclear programme and to develop its own weaponry.

Israel: recent Israeli intelligence assessments suggest that they do not believe Iranian claims to have spirited away their stocks of highly enriched uranium before the start of last month’s ‘twelve day war’. Rather they think that most or all of this material remains within the damaged facilities at Fordow and Isfahan. They have suggested that if they detect any sign of Iran attempting to dig out the entrance tunnels to these damaged underground facilities or to make a sprint for a nuclear weapon, they will strike again.

Given both the quality of their intelligence, and their ability to act at will in Iranian airspace, these threats evidently have to be taken seriously. However, Israel’s adoption of this policy opens up the possibility of repeated military action and ongoing regional instability.

Ultimately Israel will be happy if America succeeds in imposing its terms – ie a complete halt to the Iranian nuclear programme and restrictions on their missile one. Privately there is an acceptance among Israeli securocrats that whatever the quality of their military, its actions buy only limited breathing space and that ultimately a deal is needed for long term stability.

Russia: intriguingly there’s been some reporting – denied by the Kremlin – that Russia is secretly seeking to persuade Iran to give up entirely its nuclear programme. However even Russia’s public statements are clear that they have been urging Iran to get back to the negotiating table swiftly.

During previous negotiations Russia offered to take control of uranium enrichment on behalf of Iran, something the Islamic Republic rejected. But given the changed realities now that sort of offer may be made again. Even if Russia doesn’t step forward its neutrality in the recent war and emphasis on resumed negotiations have undercut Tehran’s position.

Iran: of course their position is central and currently unclear. Do they even accept it has dramatically worsened? There have been claims of victory by everyone from Ayatollah Khamenei downwards, complete with AI produced fake imagery of a shattered Tel Aviv. Is the reality just too unpleasant to acknowledge publicly? Would significant concessions on the nuclear question undercut their diplomacy of the last two decades and serve as an unacceptable humiliation for the regime?

With pressure in its various forms being piled on by the E-3, Israel, the US and even Russia, the situation facing Iran is an ugly one. They have attempted to salvage some dignity by saying they will not enter into talks under the threat of further bombing but that’s easy enough for the US to pledge if it thinks they’re engaging seriously.

In another apparent example of stalling, trying to regain some sort of leverage, Iran’s leaders ordered out the UN’s nuclear inspectors but have not withdrawn altogether from these arrangements. There is a path back to compliance. But what if the rules are about to be fundamentally rewritten, are they willing to pay the heavy price of seeing the huge investment in their nuclear programme nullified? Perhaps diplomacy can still offer a face saver or two – allowing some symbolic enrichment of uranium and nuclear research under tight controls. Or maybe that will be too bitter a pill to swallow, and the regime will prepare for the next round with Israel and the reimposition of European sanctions. The next few weeks will be fascinating.